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Since the late-1980s there has been a significant migration of Kurds from Turkey to 
the various countries in Western Europe. Even though Kurds from Turkey make up a 
significant proportion of London’s ethnic minority population, they constitute an 
‘invisible’ diasporic community, both in terms of the current debates surrounding 
ethnicity and the Muslim minority in the UK and in diaspora studies. This article 
examines how the Kurdish diaspora interacts with, and relates to, their country of 
origin by highlighting their resistance to, and struggle with, Turkey (as defined by 
their displacement and suppression of cultural and linguistic rights) as well as the 
close and, at times, intimate ties Kurds continue to maintain with Turks and Turkey. 
Whilst the first is conceptualised as ‘battling with Turkey’, the latter is conceptualised 
within the framework of ‘memleket’ (homeland) ties. The article explores how the 
Kurdish diaspora encodes its orientation towards, as well as its resistance to, Turkey 
and in so doing, brings visibility to this largely ignored and understudied, yet 
politically very active, diasporic formation in London.  
 2 
Battling with Memleket in London: the Kurdish Diaspora’s Engagement with 
Turkey 
 
The concept of ‘home’ has always been a central aspect of the battles diasporas 
engage in as they think through both how to relate to the home they have left behind 
and the new home in which they are settling. This is certainly the case for Kurds from 
Turkey. They have been defining, constructing and shaping a relationship with their 
new home in the diasporic neighbourhoods of London as well as making sense of 
their relationship with their country of origin. My concern in this article is the latter, 
namely the different ways in which Kurds1 relate to their country of origin. The central 
crux of my argument is that the Kurdish diaspora’s relationship with Turkey is best 
described in terms of ‘dual home-construction’. My use of the term dual home-
construction aims to account for and represent the two distinct -yet experienced and 
felt as one consciousness- ways in which Kurds make sense of Turkey. I call one of 
these ‘battling’ and the other ‘memleket’ (homeland), the former representing the 
political struggles and disputes of Kurds with Turkey, the latter representing the close 
and intimate ties Kurds continue to maintain with Turkey. Whilst at first sight these 
two attitudes may seem contradictory, I believe that they are not, and the way in 
which Kurds make sense of the two simultaneously should be seen as one of the 
most distinctive, but thus far ignored, aspects of the Kurdish diasporic experience. It 
might be said that most people have some level of battle with their country whilst 
continuing to see it as a homeland, whether they are living in a diaspora or not. As 
will become clear later on, the Kurdish diaspora’s relationship is different to most 
forms of battling in that it is intense, resilient, and at times radical. The intensity and 
fervent nature of this battling makes the continuation of memleket ties with Turkey all 
the more interesting. 
Kurds make up about a fifth of the population of Turkey. However, their ethnic 
identity, and cultural and linguistic rights have been suppressed in addition to their 
being socio-economically disadvantaged and facing multiple forms of deprivation and 
exclusion in Turkey (Bruinessen 1998: 48; Icduygu et al. 1999; Saraçoğlu 2010). In 
1984 the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) started a guerrilla campaign, demanding a 
separate homeland for Kurds.2 As a result of the conflict between the Turkish army 
and the PKK, many thousands (mainly civilians) lost their lives and many thousands 
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more were displaced. The PKK pressured the villages who did not support their 
cause to leave; the Turkish military forcefully evacuated scores of villages in their 
fight against the PKK. The Kurdish-populated cities such as Şırnak and Diyarbakir 
remained under ‘emergency rule’ for 15 years until 2002. Human rights violations 
also peaked during this period.3    
Faced with political oppression, economic disadvantages, poor opportunities 
as well as displacement, it is no coincidence that many Kurds from Turkey emigrated, 
mostly to European countries, from the late 1980s onwards. The majority of Kurdish 
immigrants sought asylum. In the UK, for example, Wahlbeck noted that there was a 
major influx of Turkish nationals who applied for asylum in 1989 (4650), a significant 
majority of whom were of Kurdish origin (1998: 217). Asylum applications of Turkish 
nationals continued to be in the thousands throughout the 1990s (Home Office 1998) 
and up until 2005 (Home Office 2008). Most Kurds in London, however, do not 
originate from the Kurdish region of Turkey in the southeast which experienced 
village evacuations and the most intensive fighting between the army and the Kurdish 
guerrillas. They instead originate from the central regions of Turkey and the boundary 
areas between central and eastern Anatolia, from around towns such as Maraş, 
Malatya and Sivas. They are mostly Alevis, a minority religious sect. However, as 
Sirkeci has shown with regard to Kurdish migration to Germany, the ‘environment of 
insecurity’, underpinned by ethnic conflict, fuelled Kurdish migration to Europe, even 
for Kurds with ‘no or only loose connections with the conflict itself’ (Sirkeci 2003: 203; 
Sirkeci 2006). The ethnically-fuelled ‘environment of insecurity’ in Turkey, in addition 
to the persecution of Alevis (e.g. the events in Sivas in 1993 and Istanbul Gazi in 
1995), seems to have energised Alevi Kurds to leave.  
 
Currently, therefore, a significant majority of the ‘Turks’ in London are in fact 
Alevi Kurds. They outnumber Turks and Turkish Cypriots. The total number of Kurds 
in the UK, however, is not known as the Home Office figures for asylum seekers do 
not reveal the ethnic background of applicants, but only their country of origin 
(Greater London Authority 2009: 9). We are thus left with various estimates, none of 
which is completely robust. According to one estimate, about 100,000 Kurds live in 
the UK (Dissanayake 2008); and according to another about 180,000 (Newroz 
Committee 2009: 21). However, it should be remembered that not only numerically, 
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but also in terms of political leverage, ‘the Kurds of Turkey have maintained a 
hegemonic presence in diaspora politics’ (Hassanpour and Mojab 2004: 222). 
 
When Kurds first came to London, they joined the pre-existing (albeit 
numerically small) community of Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Together with the rest of 
the Turkish-speaking community, they worked in the textile businesses of East 
London. Following the demise of textile manufacturing in East London, they moved to 
catering and now run and/or work in many of the shops, off-licenses, and catering 
businesses in North London. They also established many community organisations in 
order to facilitate their adaptation to life in Britain, geared towards solving social and 
economic problems, easing the difficulties of transition and also aiming to alleviate 
the feeling of longing for their place of origin by providing a social and cultural life and 
network. Enneli et al. highlight the vibrancy of the Turkish, Kurdish and Turkish 
Cypriot community in London, describing it as: 
 
[…] one of the most self-sufficient communities in London with half a dozen 
local community-based newspapers, together with Turkish television channels 
and countless digital radio channels. Community members can provide any 
service within the community ranging from mortgages to a quit-smoking 
helpline and from driving instruction to massage parlours. It could be 
christened ‘Little Turkey’ (2005: 2). 
 
Despite this dynamism and presence, reaching numbers well over 100.000, 
there is little academic work on Kurds in London. Kurds (and Turks) are also mostly 
invisible in policy-related research and documents in the UK (King et al. 2008: 7, 9). 
The few published works that exist focus mainly on one particular aspect of the 
Kurdish diaspora in London: their politicisation and mobilisation (Griffiths 2000, 2002 
and Wahlbeck 1998, 1999, 2002). These arise out of the collective injustices Kurds 
have faced, akin to the ‘victim diasporas’ discussed in Cohen (1997). Moreover, the 
data used in these works were collected about a decade ago, when Kurds were new 
immigrants and were still settling in London. My aim, therefore, is to provide a fresh 
and recent account, focusing on Kurds’ connection and relationship with their country 
of origin. Whilst doing this, I will outline not only how the Kurdish political struggle is 
fought in London, but also how Kurds simultaneously continue to foster warm and 
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affectionate ties with Turkey. The discussion is based on an ethnographic case 
study. I conducted in-depth interviews with 16 leading members of community 
organisations and 32 lay members of the Kurdish community in London. I attempted 
to reach a balanced sample in terms of gender, age and place of origin in Turkey. In 
addition to formal interviews, I talked to many ordinary members of the community, 
undertook observations during various demonstrations, meetings, and festivals in 
London. As much time as possible was spent participating in the activities of the 
community to get a full sense of the kind of relationships Kurds construct and 
maintain with Turkey. The bulk of the data was collected during 2009. 
 
1. Battling with Turkey 
 
One of the dual home-construction processes that can be identified amongst Kurds is 
what I call ‘battling with Turkey’. I use this to refer to the struggles for the Kurdish 
‘cause’, and the criticism, defiance and opposition shown by Kurds towards the 
Turkish state. As Griffiths (2000) has identified, up until the late 1980s, Turks and 
Kurds in London pursued leftist politics and established associations together. After 
all, many had fought on the same side against the right-wing groups, and had fled 
Turkey following military coups. Following the upsurge of ethno-politically mobilised 
Kurds in the late 1980s in London, however, some of those organisations in the 
1990s became exclusively Kurdish-oriented, and new ones were set up which came 
to have the Kurdish struggle in Turkey as their raison d’être. The discourse and 
strategies of Kurds became connected to making claims for Kurdish rights in Turkey, 
expressing their desire for the recognition of their ethnic identity. Some of these 
organisations still exist and have close links with the Kurdish struggle in Turkey; for 
example the Kurdish Advice Centre (KAC) in Tottenham, the Kurdish Community 
Centre (KCC) in Haringey, and the Turkish and Kurdish Community Centre (Halkevi). 
These associations also reflect the political divisions that exist amongst Kurds in 
London. For example, Halkevi and the KCC are mainly two branches of one 
organisation, and some of its members feel allegiance to the cause of the PKK, while 
the Kurdish Advice Centre is associated with the Kurdistan Socialist Party (PSK). 
Others have joined forces over time, such as the Kurdish Workers’ Association 
(KWA) which merged with the KCC. 
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What is important to note is that the influx of Kurds into London changed the 
nature and functioning of existing organisations. Halkevi, the largest of them, was 
previously dominated by leftist Turks and Kurds. With the arrival of mobilised Kurds, 
Kurdish ethnicity and politics gained increased significance and visibility in many 
associations, galvanising what Bruinessen (1998: 48), using Benedict Anderson’s 
phrase, refers to as ‘long-distance [Kurdish] nationalism’. The significance of Kurdish 
politics also increased among the organisations which were populated by Kurds who 
had arrived before the late 1980s, despite the fact that their previous leftist ideology 
had opposed ethnicity-based politics. In this period in London, as also happened in 
Berlin, many self-identified ‘Turks’ became self-identified ‘Kurds’, not self-identified 
‘British’ or ‘self-identified German’ (Leggewie 1996). Such changes in the ethnic 
composition, awareness and political orientation parallel what Mercer et al. have 
identified with regard to African home associations in diaspora: ‘ethnicity and home 
associations both change over time, and the means by which they change are 
closely related’ (2008: 16). 
 
Since the late 1980s then, Kurdish politics came to feature heavily in the lives 
and discourses of the Kurdish diaspora in London -an issue strongly underlined by 
the existing literature (Wahlbeck 1998; 1999; 2002; Griffiths 2000; 2002)- and the 
diaspora at large has been heavily involved in battling with their country of origin over 
the ‘Kurdish question’, often led by ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’.4 However, this battle 
needs to be viewed as encompassing a wide spectrum of views. Whilst for some this 
battle is fought for increased democratisation and Kurdish linguistic and cultural 
rights in Turkey, for others it is fought for Kurdish autonomy (federalism); still others 
aspire to the establishment of a separate home for all Kurds comprising Iraqi, Syrian, 
Turkish and Iranian Kurds. For some it is non-ethnicity based, and is instead fought 
along revolutionary Marxist lines. It is no surprise that, akin to the existence of 
multiple views of what is being fought for and what the ‘cause’ is, the battling itself is 
also carried out in multiple forms, through multiple media. These practices can be in 
the form of simple expressions of Kurdish ethnic and cultural identity, e.g. the giving 
of Kurdish (rather than Turkish or Muslim) names to children, going to language 
classes to learn Kurdish, or attending Newroz (Kurdish spring/new year) celebrations. 
They are an important part of the struggle, as speaking Kurdish, celebrating Newroz 
and the giving of Kurdish names to children have all been subject to political 
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repression in Turkey. Alternatively, battling can be in the form of making alliances 
with anti-racist, left-wing and revolutionary organisations in the UK and seeing the 
Kurdish plight in the light of a general struggle against repressive forms of 
governance and militarism. For others it involves activities such as organising or 
attending demonstrations, public meetings and discussion groups geared towards 
confronting Turkish policies and re-defining the Kurdish issue. In so doing, they 
create a ‘diasporic battlespace’, actively challenging and providing an alternative to 
the official construction of the Kurdish struggle in Turkey. 
 
Even the involvement of Kurds in local politics in London can have the 
purpose of raising awareness of the Kurdish question and identity locally, for 
instance, advocating the recognition and use of Kurdish ethnicity as a separate 
category by London authorities, or, demanding Kurdish language instruction (in 
addition to Turkish) in British schools. But it is also aimed at gaining support for the 
Kurdish struggle in Turkey. Having become British citizens and voters, Kurds have 
started to engage in the political lobbying of British political leaders on the issue of 
Kurdish rights in Turkey. Such forms of lobbying and generating support for the 
Kurds intensifies pressures on Turkey, especially in its attempts to join the European 
Union.5 What also energises the Kurdish diaspora is the existence of various cultural 
activities: politically-oriented plays, movies, documentaries, concerts and festivals. 
Musicians, for example, tell stories in their songs and describe their struggle whether 
it be against Ottoman rule or Turkish state. Documentaries that tell the story of 
Kurdish forced migration and village evacuations, and public talks about human 
rights abuses contribute to the mobilisation of Kurds by providing alternative 
narrations of the conflict. The annual Kurdish Film Festival brings films and 
documentaries not only from Turkey, but also by Kurdish directors from Iran, Iraq and 
Syria, galvanising Kurdish solidarity. Iconography of the conflict on the walls of some 
of the community organisations reminds Kurds of the battle being fought in their 
name. Thus, battling varies in both form and strength. It ranges from raising subtle 
and mild criticisms of Turkish policies towards Kurds to brash and antagonistic 
expressions, to hunger strikes, and even to taking part in militant activities (e.g. 
forcefully collecting money from Kurdish businesses in London in aid of the Kurdish 
armed struggle in Turkey). But whatever its form, the ‘diasporic battlespace’ 
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contributes to the construction and articulation of Kurdish identity and the 
mobilisation of Kurds in general.  
 
Last but not least, this battling is highly responsive to political events in 
Turkey. The Kurdish struggle and suffering in Turkey are instantly communicated via 
Turkish and Kurdish satellite TV channels, newspapers and websites (Hassanpour 
1998; Romano 2002). This is most evident when the Turkish state takes steps which 
run against Kurdish sensitivities, often leading to ad hoc, yet well-organised, 
demonstrations in London. In some of those demonstrations, Kurds carry flags and 
posters with pictures of Öcalan (the imprisoned leader of the PKK) demanding more 
rights for him. Some participants take part in demonstrations dressed as Kurdish 
guerrilla fighters. However, no matter how radical the battling gets at times, the 
battling is not static, reified nor single and coherent. It is disparate and contingent 
upon political events and developments in Turkey.6    
 
2. Memleket ties with Turkey 
 
The second connection Kurds have with Turkey is founded on what I refer to as 
memleket, which can be translated (albeit with difficulty) into English as homeland. 
This second aspect of Kurdish diasporic experience has not been studied before. It is 
perhaps one of the most fascinating aspects of the Kurdish diasporic experience as it 
is a reflection of the close and intimate relationship Kurds continue to have with their 
country of origin in spite of the battling discussed above. Memleket can refer to the 
soil that a nation-state occupies, or to a particular region, or even to a small town or 
village. It is relational and positional; when uttered outside of Turkey, it can mean 
Turkey, when in Istanbul it can refer to the Kurdish region in Turkey, or to a particular 
city (e.g. Bingöl), while when expressed in Bingöl (in the form of ‘I miss memleket’ or 
‘I am off to memleket next week’) it can refer to a small town or village that one’s 
family originates from near Bingöl (e.g. Kığı). Memleket also evokes emotion. Whilst 
it is clearly expressed to refer to a piece of land, it denotes a warm attachment and 
bond, a close and intimate relationship, not purely a geographic location. One might 
compare it to the difference in meaning between ‘home’ and ‘house’ in English. 
Memleket is closer to ‘home’ in meaning than it is to ‘house’. It is tender, warm and 
welcoming in spite of the troubles and challenges it may bring. In the remainder of 
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this article, I will uncover some of the ways in which the Kurdish diaspora actualises 
and sustains memleket ties with its country of origin. 
 
2.1 Ordinary, Everyday Memleket Ties 
 
Countless and varied ties continue to bind the Kurdish diaspora in London to Turkey. 
On the whole, Kurds continue to perceive the whole of Turkey, not just the Kurdish 
regions as memleket. This emerged in my interviews with ordinary lay members of 
the community and with those who run the Kurdish associations. A leader of one of 
them said: ‘why should we give up beautiful Istanbul, Antalya, Izmir and be pushed to 
poorer parts of Turkey; they [western parts of Turkey] are our lands too’. Another 
stated: ‘they [Kurds from London] will go to Istanbul, and will never say that it is not 
their memleket’. Most Kurds I came into contact with did not see a contradiction 
between battling with Turkey on the issue of Kurdish linguistic, cultural, political rights 
and continuing to own and claim Turkey as their memleket. On the contrary, most 
took for granted, and were quite at ease with, Kurds’ emotional attachment with 
Turkey. Their territorial identification was with Turkey in general, and the town they 
came from in particular. Identification with ‘greater Kurdistan’, the territory that 
includes parts of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria was never explicitly verbalised. Even 
when prompted, it was never verbalised as a place of belonging. Belonging and ties 
were more readily expressed for their town or city of origin in Turkey (be it Elbistan, 
Sivas or Istanbul). When asked the meaning of the maps of ‘greater Kurdistan’ which 
hang in the KAC in Tottenham, and the KCC in Haringey, it was pointed out that 
pictures of greater Kurdistan were ‘symbolic’. Their reference points remained within 
Turkey: they made decisions, maintained connections, carried out transactions, and 
expressed concerns that engaged Turkey. In other words, unlike Kurds from Turkey 
who live in Germany (Adamson and Demetriou 2007), my research did not reveal a 
significant redefinition of national belonging and homeland; on the whole, the Kurds I 
met and interviewed in London, continued to see Turkey as their memleket. 
 
In the interviews, I was pointed to how Kurds’ ties with Turkey are grounded 
and reinforced in their everyday lives. The majority of Kurds speak Turkish amongst 
themselves;7 they follow Turkish television (satellite TV) and online and print editions 
of newspapers. Turkish television is omnipresent in Kurdish homes, in the kebab 
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houses, shops, cafés and restaurants as well as community and political associations 
in north London. I met many Kurdish people who supported football teams from 
Istanbul, and some even supported (and voted for) Turkey during international 
events, e.g. the Eurovision song contest. Many Kurds invest substantial amounts of 
money in Turkey or send money to help relatives back home, generating significant 
financial flows from the UK to Turkey. Some spend their summers in Turkey’s coastal 
regions. Even a stroll up and down the area inhabited by Kurds in London clearly 
shows the emotional attachment of Kurds to their homeland. There are many 
restaurants, cafés and supermarkets run by Kurds which have Turkish names and 
cultural symbols in addition to ones which reflect Kurds’ emotional attachment to the 
Kurdish town or city from which they originate. For the majority of Kurds, their 
uprooting from Turkey was not seen as final. As I was reminded, ‘we have one foot in 
Turkey, the other here in the UK’. Rootedness in the culture, politics, and language of 
Turkey, as well as the rootedness and belonging they feel towards the Kurdish 
regions of Turkey, together with the close ties Kurds continue to maintain with family 
and relatives in Turkey8 mean that the country of origin, despite its suppression of 
Kurdish identity and language is still seen as a place to which Kurds belong and feel 
part of.  
 
2.2 Overlapping Circles and ‘Us vs. Them’ Divisions in London 
 
The Kurds’ ties with Turkey are also reinforced via the close and overlapping circles 
and networks they have with Turks in London instead of, for example, with Kurds 
from Iraq, Syria or Iran. Kurds and Turks in London, as they do in many cities in 
Europe, occupy the same geographical spaces, living ‘in close geographic proximity 
to each other in the subaltern migrant neighbourhoods of European cities’ (Soguk 
2008: 179). It would be a mistake to conceptualise the political, social, cultural and 
business networks of Kurds and Turks in London as separate, divided, and static 
entities with defined boundaries intersecting only on certain limited aspects and 
occasions. On the contrary, as I was reminded (even corrected) by some of the 
Kurdish leaders and lay members of the community that there are various networks 
to which both Kurds and Turks belong, usually depending on their social, cultural, 
political and religious affiliations and related collective action frameworks. Avoidance 
of certain organisations, as well as clashes and cleavages between them are more 
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based on these affiliations and allegiances, rather than Turkish or Kurdish ethnicity 
per se. Such overlapping networks, solidarities and collection frameworks reveal the 
existence of non-essentialist forms of belonging and identity, and also that ‘boundary-
maintenance’ (Brubaker 2005: 6) between Turks and Kurds in London is contingent 
upon political and social affiliations, stances and claims, rather than being chiefly 
ethnocentric. The ‘us vs them’ distinction, if and when drawn, was mainly between 
two groups: English people (used interchangeably with white) on the one hand, and 
Turks and Kurds on the other; and conservative, right-wing nationalist Turks on the 
one hand, and left-wing Turks and Kurds that held a direct or indirect battle with 
Turkey, on the other. The latter distinction closely follows political boundaries and 
divisions in Turkey, demonstrating that certain allegiances and divisions ‘brought 
from a prior place’ are maintained whilst in the diaspora (Clifford 1992: 115). In 
contrast, besides coming together on certain occasions (mainly during Newroz and 
folkloric dance competitions), Kurds from Turkey rarely interact with Kurds from Iraq, 
Syria or Iran. Wahlbeck (1998) also noted the rarity of contact between these groups.  
Neither did I detect a wish for pan-Kurdish activity or mobilisation on the part of Kurds 
from Turkey. On the contrary, I came across Orientalised views amongst some Kurds 
from Turkey towards Kurds from other countries. When I asked about interactions 
between Kurds from other countries, I was told by a Kurdish café owner from Turkey: 
‘Their culture is very different from ours. They are backward’. Another Kurd from 
Turkey, who is a prominent member of a leftist organisation stated: ‘Their culture is 
very different. They are feudal.’  
 
Numerous activities and associations continue to connect the Turkish and 
Kurdish diasporas and, in so doing, maintain the link between the Kurdish diaspora 
and Turkey. Political activism (mainly left-wing), festivals, music, folklore groups, 
language and supplementary afterschool classes which include both Turks and 
Kurds (for example at GİK-DER, the Refugee Workers’ Cultural Association) enable 
the continuation of bonds with one another and with Turkey. The print and electronic 
media published in London are geared towards both Turks and Kurds. Even the pro-
Kurdish newspaper Telgraf is published in both Turkish and Kurdish (as well as 
incorporating some pages in English). In addition, there exists a Turkish and Kurdish 
Football Federation (TKFF).Turks and Kurds, akin to what Østergaard-Nielsen notes 
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with regard to Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in London ‘draw on each other’s 
resources for trade, commerce, friendship and even marriage’ (2003: 687).  
 
Most community organisations and centres are explicitly geared towards 
addressing common problems. Many such as Day-Mer Community Centre, GIK-
DER, North London Community House, Yüz Çiçek Açsın Kültür Merkezi (Hundred 
Flowers Cultural Centre), Cemevi (London Alevi Cultural Centre), Derman (For the 
Well-being of Kurdish and Turkish Communities), Britanya Bariş Meclisi (Britain’s 
Peace Council), İmece (Turkish Speaking Women’s Group), and Halkevi (Turkish 
and Kurdish Community Centre) are open to both Turks and Kurds. Although 
different discursive and institutional strategies are followed by these groups, many 
are able to unite and articulate social and economic demands to the UK authorities. 
There are also collective political mobilisations. Starting in 2006, the ‘Kurdish, Turkish 
and Turkish Cypriot Election Platform’ registered thousands from the Turkish, Turkish 
Cypriot and Kurdish communities on the electoral register and succeeded in electing 
councillors in 2006 and then again in 2010 (for Hackney, Haringey and Enfield). 
 
It also needs to be remembered that this is not a homogenous community. 
Gender and class interests and identities intersect with ethnicity and at times the first 
two become more dominant than ethnicity (Pattison and Tavsanoglu 2002; Uguris 
2004). For example, Turkish, Kurdish, and Turkish-Cypriot women come together in 
their common cause to challenge patriarchy, and run solidarity organisations such as 
İmece. Female support, crossing the ethnic divide, for women contesting political 
posts is also observed. Neither can one overlook the similar problems of Turkish and 
Kurdish workers who face unemployment, poor wages, poor working conditions (long 
hours and insecure work), as well as the common worries of parents who are 
concerned about the increasing involvement of the Turkish and Kurdish youth in 
gang membership, use and trade of drugs (Arslan 2004). In summary, whilst many of 
the organisations set up by the community are normally seen as a way to ease the 
process of adaptation to Britain, they also serve to bring Kurds and Turks in London 





A third important tie which continues to define and shape Kurds’ close relationship 
with Turkey is Aleviness. Alevis are the largest group of Muslims (after Sunnis) in 
Turkey and the animosity between the two sects is well-known. The percentage of 
Alevis in Turkey (Alevi Kurds and Alevi Turks) is thought to be between 15 and 30 
percent. Like most Turks, a great majority of Kurds in Turkey are Sunnis and only 
about 30 percent are thought to be Alevi.9 For the population in London, however, the 
tables are turned. Most Kurds in London are Alevis10 and they originate from Maraş, 
Malatya and Sivas (Griffiths 2002; Wahlbeck 1998). 
 
As Çelik (2003 and 2005) has pointed out, for the Alevi Kurds in general their 
religious (namely Alevi) identity has been more central than their ethnic identity. 
Bruinessen (1996: 10) also highlights this point: ‘Many if not most of the Kurdish 
Alevis define themselves as Alevis first and only in the second place, or not at all, as 
Kurds’. In addition, Turkish and Kurdish Alevis are often closer to one another than 
say, Kurdish Alevis and Kurdish Sunnis (Çelik 2003). This means that for some 
Kurds in the diaspora (as in Turkey) their Alevi identity is stronger than their Kurdish 
identity. Moreover: ‘By and large, Kurdish as well as Turkish Alevis have been 
supportive of the secular and populist ideals of Kemalism; many Kurdish Alevis 
voluntarily assimilated to Turkish culture and came to identify themselves as Turks 
rather than as Kurds’ (Bruinessen 1996: 8).  
 
London Alevis are no exception: for example, Kurdish Alevis in London use 
Turkish as the language of ritual; they follow Alevi television channels promoting 
Alevi values, hosting Alevi singers, showing Alevi rituals, celebrating Alevi festivals.11 
Cemevi in London regularly hosts several Alevi faith leaders (dede) and researchers 
on Alevi history, culture and faith from Turkey, especially during the Alevi Aşure 
celebrations. It has a picture of Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, on its walls. In 
my interviews at Cemevi, I was told that they recognised the importance of ethnic 
identity for some, but that their aim was to bring all Alevis together, irrespective of 
their ethnicity. One interviewee even highlighted that the essence of Aleviness was 
against ethnicity-based politics. Another, this time a senior (Kurdish) Alevi figure, 




My observations at Cemevi, and my interviews with Alevis in London suggest 
that Çelik’s example of Alevi associations in Istanbul could easily apply to London 
Alevis: 
 
although the associations of Kurdish origin began co-operating in issues 
especially of concern to Kurds, many home-town associations of Alevi Kurdish 
regions [in Istanbul] feel closer in culture and political orientation to Alevi 
Turkish associations than Sunni Kurdish associations. For example Sev-Der, a 
home-town association representing the Alevi Kurds of Sevdilli, a village in 
Kahramanmaraş, is in co-operation with the home-town association of Divriği, 
a town in Central Anatolia, dominated mostly by Turkish Alevis, rather than 
any home-town association representing the neighboring Sunni Kurdish 
villages (Çelik 2003:154) 
 
It is, however, necessary to acknowledge that in the 1990s, the Kurdish 
problem and the associated Kurdish mobilisation in Turkey has encouraged Kurds 
from all sects and backgrounds (whether in the diaspora or not) to assert their 
Kurdish ethnic identity. Many Alevi Kurds also maintain that Aleviness was at times 
courted by the Turkish state against Kurdishness. However, the Alevi identity that 
Alevi Kurds share with Alevi Turks, their common concerns, interests, and practices, 
the common sectarian injustices they have together faced in Turkey, and their 
questioning of the official state construction of Aleviness in Turkey allow the 
continuation of the close ties (Alevi) Kurds have with (Alevi) Turks in London, as well 
as encourage the maintaining of strong links with Alevis in Turkey. 
 
3. Battling and Belonging 
 
So far I have examined both ‘memleket’ and ‘battling’ though providing detailed 
ethnographic data. I argued that Kurds in London relate to one space (Turkey) in two 
distinct ways, one as the country of origin in which the state oppresses Kurds, and 
against which they are engaged in a battle; and the other as their place of origin to 
which they are tied emotionally, as their memleket. I explained some aspects of how 
this is actualised, facilitated and sustained. In this final section, I will further examine 
this dual-home construction, focusing on how ‘battling’ and ‘memleket’ are 
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experienced and played out simultaneously, and on their contingent nature. I will also 
consider how the identity ties of second generation Kurds may develop in the future. 
 
First, to a naïve outsider/analyst, the two aspects of dual-home construction 
may seem to be internally inconsistent as one would question how one could 
continue to see Turkey both as one’s memleket as well as one’s oppressor. I argue 
that, for the Kurdish diaspora in London, these two views do not contribute to two 
psyches at odds with one another. Instead it is common sense and taken for granted. 
It is experienced and felt as one consciousness. Notwithstanding the continuation of 
such ties with Turks and Turkey, Kurds carry on their identity battle (with varying 
degrees of intensity) with the Turkish state. Perhaps this feeling is best illustrated by 
summarising an example I was given. One of the interviewees told a story of how, on 
television in a North London café, he watched his team Galatasaray (an Istanbul-
based football team) win a match against an Italian team. Later, as he and his 
Kurdish friends left the café and went out on the streets to celebrate, they started 
throwing stones at passing cars which were celebrating Galatasaray’s victory by 
waving Turkish flags. In other words, they reacted to Turkish symbols and 
expressions of Turkish nationalism whilst also supporting an Istanbul-based Turkish 
team in an international competition, demonstrating the complex and emotive reality 
and the contingent nature of the processes of identification and belonging of Kurds in 
London. Such feelings are made possible as Kurds make a distinction between 
Turkey the state, and Turkey the country: while they have a dispute with the former 
and its construction of the Kurdish problem, they continue to feel attached to the 
country as such. Thus for Kurds (and for many non-nationalist Turks) Turkey is not 
identified as ‘vatan’ (motherland) which is associated with Turkish statehood, the 
regime and the official construction of history and identity in Turkey. It is rather 
identified as memleket, a distinctly non-nationalist mode of expressing homeland and 
belonging.12 
 
Secondly, as is clear from my discussion of the various forms and strengths of 
the battling with Turkey, it is impossible to say that this dual home-construction is 
fixed at some common and universal level for all Kurds in London. For some Kurds, 
the battling aspect is both sharp and strong and the memleket bond is more clearly 
geared towards the Kurdish regions of Turkey. For others, the memleket feeling 
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towards Turkey is solid and resilient and the ‘battling’ is minimal. Though for many, 
battling flares up when political developments upset Kurdish sensitivities and 
interests (e.g. when Turkey’s largest Kurdish party (DTP) was outlawed by the 
Turkish Constitutional Court in December 2009). As was discussed in Section 1, 
responsiveness to such cases reveals that belonging and battling for Kurds is highly 
contingent on political developments in Turkey. 
 
For most Kurds, however, whether they are in leadership positions within 
organisations or ordinary members of the community, being both emotionally 
attached to Turkey whilst battling with it is a taken for granted aspect of their 
relationship with Turkey. The exception to this comes from some of the ‘well-
educated, mobilised and nationalist elites’ of Kurds. These elites are usually not in 
leadership positions in community organisations. They feel uncomfortable with Kurds’ 
perception of Turkey (rather than for example ‘greater Kurdistan’) as memleket. For 
example, one of the interviewees pointed out that he was annoyed with Kurds who 
transferred their civil registry records from Kurdish towns and regions to Istanbul or 
Izmir, in so doing reinforcing their links with ‘western’, ‘non-Kurdish’ regions of Turkey 
at the expense of Kurdish ones. The other said that he wished Kurds in London 
would stop regularly visiting or buying summer houses in Turkish coastal towns, and 
would instead start spending their summer holidays in another Mediterranean 
country. Neither of these interviewees was an active member of a community 
organisation, but they were highly educated, politically mobilised and informed. They 
were frustrated with ordinary Kurds who did not feel or behave like them, signalling 
that there might be a divergence between the practices, cares and concerns of 
ordinary Kurds and those who run their community organisations in London on the 
one hand, and nationalist Kurdish elites on the other.  
 
Thirdly, it is expected that the future generation Kurds’ attitudes towards 
Turkey will change over time. In the interviews, the leaders of the community centres 
highlighted emerging tensions between the first generation (including those who 
arrived in the UK in their teens) and the second generation. The extent to which this 
second Kurdish generation, most of whom are currently adolescents, will continue to 
hold a dual-home construction is yet to be seen. It might be that future generations 
will claim a stronger Kurdish ethnic identity and pursue the Kurdish struggle as a just 
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cause, intensifying the ‘battle with Turkey’. On the other hand, second generation 
Kurdish youth may move further away not only  from Turkey but also from 
Kurdishness, and may become part of the wider alienated youth of ‘immigrant’ 
communities living in the deprived ‘ghettos’ of European cities.13 Alternatively, the 
Kurdish youth may develop a more hybrid identity, for example in the form of Anglo-
Kurds (Pattison and Tavsanoglu 2002). Such hybrid identities have already formed 
elsewhere in Europe; for example newer generations of Kurds in Sweden, the 
country which hosts the largest percentage of Kurdish intellectuals (Bruinessen 1998; 
Eccarius-Kelly 2002), increasingly identify themselves as Swedish-Kurds 
(Hassanpour and Mojab 2004: 222). There is also talk of ‘EuroKurdishness’ emerging 
as a result of European Kurds increasingly identifying with the continent and 
becoming ‘Euroversal’ (Soguk  2008: 176) and of the possibility of cosmopolitan 
perspectives and practices (rather than singular ethnic ones) surfacing in London, 
akin to what Çağlar (2001) noted in Berlin among second generation immigrants from 
Turkey. 
 
What is worth pointing out is that the extent to which this second generation 
(and future ones) will continue to see Turkey as memleket will not only depend on 
their experiences in the UK or their parents’ attitudes towards the Kurdish ‘cause’, but 
possibly much more so on the willingness of the Turkish establishment (particularly 
the bureaucratic and military elites) and mainstream media (Demir and Zeydanlıoğlu 
2010) to break with past tradition and abandon their uncompromising attitude 
towards increased Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights. The current Turkish 
government has recently been taking steps towards greater democratisation and an 
increased recognition of Kurdish rights. However, there is a growing backlash against 
these developments in Turkey, including an increased popular anti-Kurdish feeling 
(Saraçoğlu 2010). The steeply rising tide of Turkish nationalism and anti-Kurdish 
feeling which may be followed by repression or deferral of Kurdish linguistic and 
cultural rights, may signal to the future generation of Kurds in the diaspora that 





This paper focused on and brought visibility to Kurds, a largely unstudied, yet 
increasingly significant and political diasporic formation in London. It presented 
detailed ethnographic data and analysis of how Kurds from Turkey interact with, and 
relate to, their country of origin by uncovering their dual home attachment: namely 
their political battle with Turkey, and their affectionate perception of Turkey as 
memleket. It identified that the kinds of battles which Kurds are engaged in are 
multiple and varied, encompassing a wide spectrum of activities, depending on how 
they construct what is being fought for and what the ‘cause’ is. It detected that the 
Kurdish battle is dynamic and highly responsive to politics in Turkey, exposing the 
‘contingencies of belonging and battling’ in the diaspora. In addition, it pointed out 
that this alternative political sphere, in the form of ‘diasporic battlespace’, challenges 
the official construction of the Kurdish problem in Turkey. The study also identified 
that no matter how radical the battling gets at times, most Kurds in London have 
warm, intimate, and close memleket ties with Turkey. It did this by uncovering the 
everyday, ordinary ties Kurds in London continue to have with Turkey, and the 
overlapping circles they maintain with Turks in London. It argued that Aleviness, 
another central identity that many Kurds in London draw on, encourages the 
resilience and preservation of networks and links with Turkey.  
 
The paper builds on the work of those who examined the Kurdish diaspora 
when Kurds were newly arrived and adjusting to London (Griffiths 2002; Wahlbeck 
1999, 2002) by providing both new ethnographic data, and a fresh perspective. 
Unlike most existing studies of Kurds in London or in other European capitals, the 
paper does not solely focus on Kurds’ anti-Turkey mobilisation. Without denying its 
importance, it unsettles the prioritisation of Kurds’ antagonistic relationship with 
Turkey in the field of Kurdish studies and diaspora (Adamson and Demetriou 2007; 
Bruinessen, M. Van 1998; Eccarius-Kelly 2002; Leggewie 1996; Lyon and Uçarer 
2001; Østergaard-Nielsen 2000 & 2001). By providing a detailed and thorough 
analysis of their continuing affectionate and close ties in the form of memleket, it 
shows that Kurds’ relationship with Turkey cannot be reduced to the battling they 
engage in, but that Kurds’ diasporic ‘battling’ needs to be understood and examined 
in the context of the memleket feelings they continue to harbour. In so doing, it also 
contributes to wider studies of migration and ethnicity as it reveals the non-reified and 
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1 This article specifically focuses on Kurds from Turkey. In the remainder of the article, when 
I refer to ‘Kurds’, I mean Kurds from Turkey who are living in London.  
 
2 The PKK is listed as a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the European Union and the US. 
 
3 For various reports of this conflict see Human Rights Watch (2010). 
 
4 Not all those who ‘left’ Turkey have been politically active, mobilised and oriented towards 
what they see as injustices in Turkey. For a comparison, see Toktaş 2007 on Jews who 
migrated from Turkey to Israel. 
 
5 See Eccarius-Kelly 2002 for a discussion of legislative pressures and political lobbying 
applied by Kurds (usually ones based in Germany) to the European Parliament and the 
Council of Europe.  
 
6 For a discussion of the role of Kurdish diasporic activism in the shaping of the Kurdish 
movement in Turkey see Bruinessen (1998); Lyon and Uçarer (2001); Østergaard-Nielsen 
(2001). 
 
7 Suppression of the Kurdish language, as well as assimilation strategies in Turkey mean that 
Turkish is not only used extensively by ordinary Kurds in London, but ‘somewhat ironically, 




8 Due to village evacuations, as well as urbanisation, Istanbul has become the city with the 
biggest Kurdish population in the world with the ‘western’ parts of Turkey also possessing a 
sizable Kurdish population (Bruinessen 1998; Saraçoğlu 2010). 
 
9 The official census in Turkey does not include data on Kurdish ethnicity or on Alevis. 
 
10 According to the estimates of the Alevi Religious Centre (Cemevi) in London, 80% of 
those from Turkey are Alevi; and of those 70% are Kurds. 
 
11 For a discussion of the Alevi movement and identity in diaspora, see Massicard 2003 who 
focuses on Alevis in Germany. Published academic work on Alevis in London is non-existent. 
 
12 As was pointed out by some of the Kurds in London, in their denial of, and/or non-
engagement with, politicised Kurds in UK, the Turkish authorities problematise ‘battling’; 
and do not sufficiently recognise Kurdish diaspora’s ‘memleket’ ties. 
 
13 For a discussion on the low levels of educational attainment amongst the Kurdish and 
Turkish community in London see Enneli et al. 2005, Greater London Authority 2009, Issa 
2004. Enneli et al. (2005: 53) argue that ‘young Turkish-speaking origin people are also 
among the most disadvantaged groups in multicultural London. … There is little life beyond 
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